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In this paper, we propose an economic model to analyse the sales out of new products. This 
model accounts for the fact that even among firms for which R&D is a permanent activity, a 
fraction of firms does not have sales of innovative products during a two-year observation 
period. We propose a model in which the fixed costs of introduction is a major concern in the 
decision making process. In a structural model we estimate the fixed costs of the market 
introduction of new products and explain subsequent sales of innovative products. We examine a 
indicator of innovative output, i.e. sales of products 'new to the firm'. We estimate fixed costs 
thresholds using data from the Dutch part of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) from 1998. 
R&D intensity, competition and market structure have a positive impact on sales of new 
products. The most important factors to decrease the fixed costs threshold of introduction are 
product related R&D investments, R&D subsidies and knowledge spillovers. 
Keywords: Innovation, Product R&D, Threshold model  
JEL Classification: C51 (Model construction and estimation), L23 (Organization of production), 
O30 (Technological change, research and development) 
1  Introduction 
In this paper we present a new model to provide insight in the innovation process. This model 
accounts for the fact that even among firms for which R&D is a permanent activity, a fraction of 
firms does not have sales of innovative products during a two-year observation period. We 
propose a model in which the fixed costs of introduction is a major concern in the decision 
making process. In this study we analyse an indicator of a firm’s innovative output, i.e. sales per 
employee of products that are ‘new to the firm’. This indicator has been analysed in Brouwer 
and Kleinknecht (1996) first. They noted that, during the observation year, many firms had no 
sales out of new products and proposed an ad hoc model to deal with the observations with zero 
sales. A drawback of their procedure is that the parameter estimates do not have a clear 
interpretation.  
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In this study we start from the assumption that, in order to introduce a product innovation, the 
firm must incur fixed costs. At the time of considering a new product introduction, the firm will 
compare fixed costs with expected (net) revenues during the economic lifetime of the product, 
and only if revenues exceed fixed costs, the firm will introduce the product. We show that this 
simple theoretical model leads to a specific censored regression model, the stochastic threshold 
model. Moreover, from theoretical considerations one can argue that variables that affect fixed 
costs do not have a direct effect on the level of sales. This suffices to identify the parameters of 
the threshold model. Although, without further assumptions, we cannot estimate fixed costs 
directly, we can identify determinants of the threshold and of the sales of innovative products. 
This is an improvement on the estimates obtained in Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1996) who did 
not distinguished between these two equations. Their estimates are reduced-form estimates, 
while we present structural estimates that correspond to a structural economic model, and allow 
for an interpretation in the context of that model.  
Our paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we introduce the theoretical model and describe 
the corresponding econometric model. Section 3 discusses our data. Section 4 presents our 
hypotheses. In section 5 we present and discuss the outcomes of our estimates, and conclusions 
are drawn in section 6. 
2  Sales of innovative products with fixed costs of introduction 
In this paper we deal with a theoretical and empirical model based on Brouwer (1997). Some 
investments have the character of irreversible sunk costs, which explains the observation that the 
resale or scrap value of certain investments (e.g. some specialised pieces of machinery) is much 
lower than the purchasing price. The introduction of an innovative product that is new to the firm 
is also imperfectly reversible and involves fixed costs. Such fixed costs can be related to 
investment in specific knowledge, acquisition of patent rights, training, market research, 
advertising, or purchase of specialised equipment. In this section we develop a theoretical model 
that takes into account these fixed costs of introduction. This model implies that the innovative 
product is introduced if (expected) sales exceed a certain threshold. We then specify a statistical 
model that corresponds to this economic model, and we show that the restrictions that can be 
derived from the economic model are sufficient to identify this threshold, which we assume to be 
firm specific.   3 
2.1  The theoretical model 
Besides fixed costs of introduction, there may be other reasons of why an R&D performing firm 
does not have sales of innovative products in a particular year. The product may be still under 
development or the firm may have realised only process innovations that were asked for in a 
yes/no question (without assessing sales related to it). In our analysis, we concentrate on firms 
that engage permanently (other than occasionally) in R&D and that have been developing new 
products in the recent past. Wider definitions of sample firms have also tentatively been used in 
our estimates but will not be documented in detail, since these analyses did not lead to 
substantially different outcomes. We assume that our R&D performing firms must decide in any 
year whether to introduce some innovative product.  
First, we introduce the variables used in the model. 
s  = R&D spending; 
y  = annual sales of the innovative product; 
m  = expected annual sales of the innovative product; 
c  = fixed cost of introduction of the innovative product; 
T  = economic lifespan of the innovative product; 
r  = discount rate; 
g  = mark-up of the price over variable cost per unit. 
Without loss of generality we assume that all R&D spending is done at time 0, just before the 
introduction decision. At that time the expected discounted return from the investment s is 
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We assume that R&D spending s has a positive effect on the expected sales of the innovative 
product. The first-order condition for a profit maximum is 





rT . . s 1 1 - ¢ =
-  
If we assume that  ( ) m
'' s < 0 and  ( ) m
' s  > 0, then the first-order equation has a finite solution 
which may be 0. We denote this optimal R&D investment by s
opt. The optimal level of R&D 
spending is independent of the fixed cost of introduction c. Furthermore, R&D spending rises 
with g, which is an index of competition. The stronger competition, the lower is the optimal 
R&D spending. Unfortunately we do not have an index of competition. Instead we use a 
Herfindahlindex as a proxy of competition.
2 The optimal level rises also with T, and it falls with 
r. We unfortunately have no indicator of the economic lifespan of the innovative product at our 
                                                
2   Strictly speaking a Herfindahlindex of concentration is not an equivalent of an index of competition. 
However in concord with the Structure-Conduct-Performance framework a concentration index can be 
regarded as a proxy of competition (Church & Ware, 2000).   4 
disposal. This may seem an important omission in order to identify the proposed model. 
However from a an entrepreneurial point of view future sales are unknown and the decision to 
introduce a new product onto the market will depend on expected sales, which will depend on 
demand i.e. consumer preferences, and product substitution and imitation, in short competition, 
which is already incorporated in the model. We will elaborate on supply, demand and market 
conditions later on. 
Note that m(s) is the expected sales at the time that the level of R&D spending is determined. In 
this model these expenditures on R&D are called the current R&D spending which are the costs 
the entrepreneur is expected to recover from sales to distinguish from the R&D spending in the 
past which can be considered as sunk cost, which by definition have no relevance in the decision 
making process whether or not to introduce new products onto the market. At the moment that 
the decision whether to introduce the innovative product is taken, the expected sales differ from 
their previously expected value by a prediction error n and are equal to  
(3)  n + m = ) (s y
opt  
The innovation is introduced if and only if the expected discounted return exceeds the fixed cost 
of introduction 
(4)  ( ) ( ) ( ) g m n . s .







Equation (3) and inequality (4) specify a threshold regression model: if the expected revenues 
exceed the threshold costs (in inequality (4)) then sales are given in equation (3).  
This simple theoretical model implies that the optimal level of R&D spending and hence the 
expected sales of the new product, is independent of the cost of introduction. This does not mean 
that the R&D effort is independent of the costs of introduction. If the expected costs of 
introduction are high, the project may be unprofitable, i.e. the expected discounted return in (1) 
may be negative, and the project will not be implemented. However, given that a project is 
profitable, the optimal spending is independent of the fixed costs of introduction. This result is 
important for the specification of the threshold model, because it justifies the exclusion of 
variables that affect the fixed cost of introduction from the sales equation. It should be stressed 
that in our empirical model R&D effort is an explanatory and not a dependent variable, i.e. we 
model sales of innovative products given (past) R&D effort. 
2.2  The econometric model 
For the specification of the econometric model that corresponds to equations (3) and (4), it is 
convenient to introduce some further notation: 
y  =  observed annual sales of innovative products;   5 
y
*  =   latent annual sales of innovative products; 
c
*  =   latent fixed threshold; 
x  =  exogenous variables that influence the sales of innovative 
     products;  
z  =  exogenous variables that influence the threshold of sales of  
    innovative products; 
b  =  vector of regression coefficients of variables x; 
a  =  vector of regression coefficients of variables z; 
e  =  error term of sales equation; 
h  =  error term of threshold equation; 
se  =  standard deviation of e;  
sh  =  standard deviation of h; 
r  =  correlation coefficient of e and h. 
We do not attempt to estimate the structural model in (3) and (4) directly. From (4) we see that 
the threshold is  
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We express c
* in (5) and m( ) s
opt  in (3) as a function of exogenous variables z and x, 
respectively. In the sequel, we use the exclusion restrictions of the economic model. In other 
words, variables that affect the threshold through the fixed cost c do not enter the sales equation 
(3). Hence we obtain the latent regression equations 
(6)  c z
* = + a h  
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Firms will have sales of new products if and only if the (expected) sales of the new product 
exceed the threshold c
*.
 Hence, the latent and observed variables are related by  
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The probability of positive sales of a new product is 
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where s s s rs s
h h e e h *
2 2 2 2 = + - , and F is the cumulative distribution function of the standard 
normal distribution. The expected sales of the innovative product, conditional on the event that 
they are positive, are  










































where f is the density function of the standard normal distribution. 
The likelihood function of the threshold model is derived from the joint distribution of the 
observed variables (y, I)  
(13)  ( ) ( ) f I I y,
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It is also possible to estimate the model by a two-stage estimation method (see Maddala (1983, 
pp. 228-230)). We used the estimates of the two-stage method as starting values for the 
maximum likelihood estimation.  
Nelson (1977, p. 315) and Maddala (1983 p. 229) discuss the identification of the parameters of 
the threshold model. A sufficient condition for identification is that the sales equation contains at   7 
least one exogenous variable that is not in the threshold equation. As noted before, variables that 
affect the threshold through the cost of introduction can be excluded from the sales equation, so 
that this condition can be easily satisfied. 
3  The data 
3.1  Source and background 
We use data from the Dutch part of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) for the years 1994-
1996 (CIS2) and 1996-1998 (CIS2½, see CBS 1998, 2000). We merged the two datasets in order 
to have information on a longer period of time and to be able to construct lagged exogenous 
variables, which will be discussed later on. Both questionnaires consisted of two parts. In the 
first part, firms were asked to report basic information on the firm, such as the branch of 
principal activity, sales, exports, employment, etc. The second part contained questions on R&D, 
innovation and related issues. Only firms that answered at least one of the following three 
questions in the affirmative were asked to complete the second part of the questionnaire:  
￿  Did your firm develop any technologically changed products during 1996-98? 
￿  Did your firm develop any technologically changed processes during 1996-98? 
￿  Does your firm plan to develop any technologically changed products or processes in the 
years 1999-2001? Firms affirming one or more of these questions in both questionnaires are 
defined as being innovative. 
 
In the survey, a distinction is made between three types of product (1) essentially unchanged 
products, (2) incrementally improved products and (3) radically changed or totally new products. 
In this paper we will refer to the last category as 'innovative products' and is our object of 
analysis. In the survey a further distinction is made between: 
￿  Products 'new to the firm'; 
￿  Products 'new to the market'. 
Although it is tempting to use products 'new to the market' as an indicator of the most innovative 
products we will use products 'new to the firm' as the endogenous variable because the indicator 
'new to the market' suffers from a serious problem in the way firms are interpreting their scope of 
the relevant market. For instance are firms referring to the Dutch market, the European or the 
global market? Brouwer & Kleinknecht (1996) point to the relationship between the export quote 
of firms and the turnover out of products ‘new to the market’, the higher the export quote the less 
they report of having turnover out of products ‘new to the market’. From this it seems that firms 
more orientated to the home market, which tends to be relatively small in the Dutch case, are   8 
overestimating their innovative efforts. To avoid this ambiguity we restrict our analysis to sales 
new to the firm. 
3.2  Descriptive statistics 
From the merged dataset firms in the service sector were excluded first because of the fact that 
those firms do not produce products but services, which are outside the scope of this paper. Next 
firms were selected meeting the following criteria: presented in both questionnaires (CIS2 and 
CIS2½), being innovative in 1994-1998 and have R&D output in at least 1996-1998, being 
industrial firms with 10 employees or more. Finally this selection resulted in a database of 2279 
firms. A brief comparison of firms selected and those excluded from the sample show that small 
firms are underrepresented in the sample, and the selected firms on average have a higher 
exportquote (see the appendix). Within this sample of 2279 firms we distinguish two groups of 
firms. The first group comprise of 1002 innovative firms with turnover out of innovative 
products in 1996-1998 as defined earlier. The second group are innovative firms without 
turnover out of innovative products in 1996-1998. The latter group comprise of 1277 firms 
focussing on process innovations or firms in the stage of developing new products not yet 
introduced onto the market.  
 
The descriptive statistics for all innovative firms are given in Table 1. Table 1 shows that the 
average turnover is approximately 31 million Dutch Guilders or 16 million US Doller.
3 The 
difference in turnover between firms with and without turnover out of innovative products is 
small and insignificant. Also the number of employees does not differ significantly between the 
two groups of firms. The average size is about a hundred employees. The standard deviations of 
total turnover and the number of employees are quite large because about 90 percent of all Dutch 
firms have 50 employees or less but also that there are a few large (multinational) companies in 
the sample which have high labour productivity and high sales of new products. Thus this 
reflects the very skewed distribution of size of firms in the Netherlands. Because of this and for 
theoretical considerations on which we will elaborate later on we will model size in a non-linear 
fashion. On average innovative firms obtain about 13% of their turnover out of the sale of 
                                                
3   In 2000 the Dutch Guilder was replaced by the Euro. All the statistics before 2000 are in Dutch 
currency. In the year 1998 the average exchange rate was 1.9825 Guilder for one US Dollar (source 
Dutch National Bank, DNB).     9 
innovative products and approximately 8.3% if weighted with the size of firms meaning that 
larger firms have less turnover out of new products.   10 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the model 
   (1) All 
innovative 
firms 












   mean  std.dev.  mean  std.dev.  mean  std.dev.  Sig* 
Dummy: 1 = turnover out of products new to the firm 1998  0.440  0.496  1   0    
Log turnover 1998  17.269  1.464  17.241  1.491  17.292  1.443   
Log turnover out of products new to the firm 1998  6.487  7.423  14.754  1.818  n/a  n/a   
Turnover out of products new to the firm as % of total turnover 1998  0.059  0.116  0.133  0.144  n/a  n/a   
Log number of employees (FTE) 1998  4.580  1.094  4.604  1.134  4.562  1.062   
R&D employment intensity 1996  0.024  0.056  0.041  0.067  0.014  0.047  *** 
% of total R&D spending which have to be recovered 1996  0.385  0.392  0.394  0.366  0.378  0.411  *** 
Source of information: internal (score 0..1) 1996  0.396  0.310  0.536  0.241  0.338  0.317  *** 
Source of information: suppliers or customers (score 0..1) 1996  0.324  0.284  0.449  0.241  0.268  0.283  *** 
Source of information: publicly available information, proxy for knowledge spillovers (score 0..1) 1996  0.193  0.190  0.279  0.180  0.152  0.177  *** 
Dummy: 1 = firms established in 1994-1996  0.022  0.148  0.024  0.153  0.021  0.144   
Dummy: 1 = firms engaged in R&D-cooperation 1996  0.270  0.444  0.392  0.489  0.211  0.408  *** 
Dummy: 1 = firms received subsidies to stimulate technological progress 1998  0.428  0.495  0.626  0.484  0.273  0.445  *** 
Observations  2279   1002   1277    
 
Difference between means of firms in dataset 2 and dataset 3:  *** = significant at the 1% level, ** = significant at the 5% level and * = significant at the10% level 
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The descriptive statistics of the variables for dataset 1 (all innovative firms), 2 (firms with 
turnover out of new products) and 3 (firms without new products) are different, except for the 
following variables: turnover, the number of employees and the fraction of firms established in 
1994-1996. Dataset 3 has the lowest values and dataset 2 the highest values for these variables.  
4  Hypotheses 
Before we present the results we formulate the hypotheses to be tested with our model. This 
allows us to identify variables that can be included or excluded from either the fixed cost 
equation or sales equation. First we deal with hypotheses regarding the sales equation, after that 
we deal with the fixed cost equation. 
Determinants of sales of new products 
In general the market of new products like any other market is determined predominantly by 
supply, demand and market conditions, next to other determinants like institutional factors or 
progress of technology, which we leave aside. In principle firms are only capable to adapt to 
changes in market conditions by changing their own products i.e. the firm specific supply 
characteristics and like the entrepreneurs we assume demand factors as given.  
The same could be argued about market conditions, only very large firms are in the position to 
use their market power to mould the market conditions to their interests; the majority of smaller 
firms have to accept market conditions as given. In the case of market conditions however the 
situation is more complicated in how decision-making firms deal with competition and which 
indicators will influence the sales of new products. On the firm level firms compete on product 
characteristics, price, quality and other firm / product specific factors, but on a more aggregate 
level competition is the resultant of technological development and demand articulation which 
can be understood using the theoretical ideas of the product life cycle model which brings 
together the combined effects of technology development, dominant design, demand, entry and 
exit, the distribution of size of firms, and market conditions in time.
4 For instance if in a specific 
                                                
4  The model of the product life cycle builds on the work of Gort & Klepper (1982) and Klepper & 
Graddy (1990). See among others Jovanovic & MacDonald (1994) and Klepper & Simons (2000), 
Klepper (2002) for an empirical assessment. The notion of dominant design stems from Albernathy and 
Utterback (1978), Rosenberg (1982) and Sahal (1986). For a review of the notion of dominant design in 
economics see Nelson (1995). A different strand of literature points at the relationship between business 
cycles and innovation using the 'demand pull' and 'supply push' paradigm, and the associated 
controversy (see Schmookler, 1996, Scherer, 1982). The causal effects of demand pull or supply push 
on innovative activities are not substantiated by empirical findings however (Scherer, 1982, Geroski & 
Walters, 1995).    12 
branch there are many opportunities for technological development and improvements and thus a 
strong articulated demand, firms are forced to invest more in the development of new products 
because older products are superseded by superior new product (of competing firms). On average 
the percentage of turnover out of new products will be higher compared to branches with lower 
technological opportunities. In branches characterised by mature technology and modest 
opportunities for further technological development firms are more likely to improve products on 
an incremental basis, and their earnings will stem predominately from improved or unaltered 
products (but probably cheaper produced because of cost reducing process innovations).  
 
H1: New established firms are a potential bias? 
The sample includes mature firms and new established firms. First of all we have to correct for 
start-up firms because by necessity new or start-up firms only have sales from new products and 
no sales out of improved or unaltered products. Therefore we include in the sales equation a 
dummy if a firm is a start-up-firm i.e. a firm established in the 1994-1996 era or not in order to 
correct for this potential bias. We expect this dummy to have a positive effect on the level of 
sales. 
H2: R&D-intensity and sales of new products. 
Since R&D-expenditures are a major input into the innovation process, we expect a firm’s R&D 
intensity to be related directly to its 'output' of product innovations. R&D intensity is a proxy for 
firm specific adaptation to market conditions and branch specific technological change.  
H3: Competition / Market structure and sales of new products 
According to the product life cycle model in the first stages of technological development there 
are many small firms competing on design and product / market combinations. In this situation 
the market structure shows a low seller concentration. The prospect of becoming a market leader 
if a firm succeeds in establishing a dominant design or product-market combination, which will 
attract many adventurous entrepreneurs. This is called the period of experimentation with 
various product market combinations. This period ends when a certain product-market 
combination begins to dominate technological development and consumers are more inclined 
towards a particular design. Firms are forced more or less to abandon their not so successful 
product-market combination in favour of a more successful design of a competitor.   
Later on when a dominant design has been established firms start competing on price and 
economies of scale becomes an important determinant to survive, starting the 'oligopolistic 
shake-out'. Many firms who fail to achieve a minimum efficient scale of production sooner or 
later have to exit, resulting in a market dominated by a few large firms competing on price   13 
(Klepper 1996). Firms facing a Bertrand competition however have a strong incentive to increase 
their profit margin by means of product differentiation and thus resulting in more sales out of 
new products if their products succeed over time (Martin, 1993, Kanovski, 2005). The larger 
incumbent firms will invest heavily in process innovations maximizing the effects of economies 
of scale in order to sustain their dominant position and to lower the incentives for rival firms to 
enter the market. 
Therefore we expect an (stylized) U-shape relationship between sales of new products and the 
seller concentration expressed as Herfindahl-equivalent index.
5 This U-shape is also congruent 
with the Schumpeter mark I and II relationship between the size of the firm and the incentive to 
innovate (Baumol, 2002, Kamien & Schwartz, 1975, 1982, Scherer, 1962, 1992).
6  
 
Determinants of the fixed cost equation 
H4: Product related R&D investments and the fixed cost equation.  
In the advent of the introduction of a new product onto the market we expect that firms shift their 
total R&D expenditures towards more product-related R&D-expenditures such as expenditures 
on development of production facilities or specialised equipment, design and marketing and 
away from expenditures on fundamental or basic research according to the chain-linked model of 
innovation of Kline & Rosenberg (1986). The exogenous variable Rdpintr96, defined as the 
percentage of total R&D-investment spend on the introduction of new products captures this 
shift in R&D expenditures and we expect that the more firms have to spend on product-
development related R&D-activities the higher the costs of introduction will be, that means the 
costs that have to be recurred. These costs differ from R&D-expenditures in the pre-competitive 
phase of product-development, which can be considered as sunk costs. Sunk costs by definition 
are irrelevant in the decision making process whether to introduce new products onto the market 
or not.  
 
H5: R&D co-operation and R&D subsidies lower the Fixed Costs of sales of new products 
The sharing of knowledge and risks through R&D co-operation agreements decreases the fixed 
cost of introduction of new products, besides enhancing future innovation benefits by 
internalising positive external effects (de Bondt, 1996). R&D subsidies lower the fixed costs 
directly. 
                                                
5   The Herfindahl-equivalent is equal to the reciprocal of the Herfindahl index (1/H). The Herfindahl 
index is the sum of the squared market shares of firms in a particular sector.  
6   Recently Aghion et al (2005) proposed a different theoretical model to explain an inverted U-shape 
between the innovation activities and competition. Their model will be discussed in the result section.    14 
H6: Knowledge spillovers and the fixed cost equation 
Innovation is all about developing (technical) knowledge. In his seminal paper Jaffe (1986) 
states that: 'Since knowledge is inherently a public good, the existence of technologically related 
research efforts of other firms may allow a given firm to achieve results with less research effort 
than otherwise', pp. 984.
7 From this we expect that using external sources of knowledge such as 
information from consultants, universities, patent-data, and other semi-public agencies 
(brinf_96) will lower the costs of R&D or more in particular the fixed costs of introducing new 
products onto the market. Besides knowledge spillovers originating from (semi) public sources, 
we distinguish two other sources of knowledge. The first one is internal sources of information 
i.e. information rendered inside the firm (brint_96). The second one is sources of information 
originating from suppliers and customers (brrel_96). According to von Hippel (1988), it is not 
necessarily the inventor who will develop the innovation. Instead the actor in the vertical chain 
of product development (distributed innovation process) who has the best opportunity to manage 
the appropriability conditions will be the innovator. We expect that firms who rely on 
information of suppliers and customers as sources of innovation have a better opportunity to 
appropriate the rents of innovation and will have to spend less on costs on introduction of new 
products (see among others Lilien et.al., 2002). For instance if the source of innovation is from a 
lead customer/user, the innovating firms will face less market uncertainties and thus have to 
spend less in marketing costs compared to a firm who relies predominately on internal generated 
ideas.  
Other exogenous variables 
H7: Size of firms and innovative products 
An important exogenous variable is the size of the firms, operationalized as the log of the 
number of employees. We expect the size of the firm will affect the level of sales and the amount 
of investments to introduce new products onto the market both. The larger the firms the more 
resources are available to invest in the introduction of new products and at the same time larger 
firms are expected to have better market opportunities to realise sales out of new products. This 
combined effect resembles the theory of 'spreading' introduced by Cohen & Klepper (1996) to 
explain why larger firms invest relatively more in R&D albeit with a lower efficiency compared 
                                                
7   See also Bernstein & Nadiri (1988) who distinguish between receiving and sending industries within a 
spillover network. From the point of view of individual firms, a firm tends to focus on receiving 
knowledge spillovers and at the same time try to avoid sending spillovers and thus creating positive 
appropriability conditions (Teece, 1986). CIS2 does not comprise direct information to distinguish 
between incoming (receiving) and outgoing (sending) knowledge spillovers, especially the measurement 
of outgoing knowledge spillovers is cumbersome (see Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002, in a attempt to use 
proxies to distinguish between incoming and outgoing knowledge spillovers).   15 
to smaller firms. The explanation of Cohen & Klepper boils down to the fact that due to their 
market share and distributions and marketing efforts larger firms need less successful innovative 
products to cover their initial R&D-investments and for that matter small firms with very limited 
resources can not bear the risk of market failure of new products and therefore have to choose 
their R&D-investment more carefully, resulting in more efficient R&D-investments, i.e. a higher 
R&D-investment new product ratio, conditional on succeeding to tackle the hurdle of new 
product development. The situation is a bit more complicated though. On average larger firms 
will have a larger product portfolio and to prevent 'cannibalizing' their existing product portfolio 
larger firms will be more reluctant to introduce new products onto the market (Conner, 1988). 
We will expect that size will have a non-linear effect on both the level of sales and on the fixed 
cost. Initially when firms are relatively small, the size effect will have a strong positive effect, 
but when firms become larger the positive effect of being large will diminish and due to the 
'cannibalizing' effect on the existing product portfolio.   
Further on we include branch dummies in the cost equation in order to correct for technology 
and or branch specific cost of introduction. 
5  Results 
The estimates of the threshold model are summarised in Table 2 for products new to the firm. 
The threshold is not observed directly but can be derived from the model by subtracting the costs 
of introduction from the sales. A positive coefficient in the costs equation means that the 
corresponding variable is positively related to the sales threshold. In other words, it increases the 
threshold. If the coefficient of a variable that appears in the costs equation and in the sales 
equation is positive and if it is larger in the sales equation than in the threshold equation, then the 
variable increases the probability that the firm innovates (see equation 11). The same is true if 
the coefficient in the sales equation is negative and smaller than in the threshold equation. 
Even though the threshold is not observed, the parameters of the threshold equation and those of 
the sales equation are identified by exclusion restrictions. The theoretical model of section 2.1 
implies that variables that affect the fixed costs can be excluded from the sales equation. For that 
reason a variable such as R&D collaboration (partne96) or product introduction related R&D-
expenditures (rdpintr96) do not enter the sales equation. We do allow for correlation between the 
error terms in the threshold and sales equations. This correlation captures common firm specific 
variables that have been omitted from both equations.     16 
Table 2: The estimation results 
    Sales equation      Fixed Costs equation   
    Exogenous variables   coefficient t-value       coefficient t-value   
constant constant  11.004 185.020***   10.699 170.853*** 
 dstart96 Dummy: 1 = firms established in 1994-1996  0.337 5.524***         
   rdi_96 R&D employment intensity 1996  1.670 25.652***         
   lnw_98 Log turnover 1998  0.813 28.214***   1.468 28.214*** 
   lnw298 Log turnover 1998, squared  0.303 7.513***   -0.231 7.513*** 
   he3d98 Herfindahl equivalent index  -0.195 -6.611***         
  he3d982 Herfindahl equivalent index squared  0.237 7.414***         
 rdpintr6 % of total R&D spending which have to be recovered 1996           0.134 2.360 ** 
 partne96 Dummy: 1 = firms engaged in co-operation 1996           -0.036 -0.649  
 subsid98 Dummy: 1 = firms received subsidies to stimulate technological progress 1998           -1.017 -17.997*** 
 brint_96 Source of information: internal (score 0..1) 1996           -0.466 -7.621*** 
 brrel_96 Source of information: suppliers or customers (score 0..1) 1996           -0.475 -7.740*** 
 brinf_96 Source of information: publicly available information, proxy for knowledge 
spillovers (score 0..1) 1996           -1.117 -17.444*** 
 sbi_pdj2 Dummy: 1 = Pavitt taxonomy, Scale-intensive industrial firms 
#           -1.244 -21.515*** 
 sbi_pdj3 Dummy: 1 = Pavitt taxonomy, Specialised equipment suppliers 
#           -1.139 -18.844*** 
                 
  Nr. obs.  2279           
  Loglikelihood  -2892.82           
  Loglikelihood base-line model  -3583.59           
    LR test  1381.54         
    Mc Fadden R
2  0.19         
    Zimmerman-Veal R
2  0.50         
 
*** = Significant at the 1% level, ** = significant at the 5% level and * = significant at the10% level 
#  Adopted from Pavitt (1984). 
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Next, we discuss the parameter estimates in tables 2 starting with the effect of size on both the 
fixed costs and sales, followed by the parameter estimates of the sales equation and last the 
parameter estimates of the fixed costs equation.  
Size 
As expected lager firms realise higher sales of new products. Larger firms benefit from 
economies of scale and scope and thus have the production and marketing capacity to realize 
higher sales of new products. Smaller firms are forced to focus on niche markers, which by 
definition are smaller, and thus the potential to realise sales of new products is smaller as well. 
Parameter estimates of the sales equation 
Table 2 shows that new firms (dstart96) have indeed a significant higher percentage of sales of 
new products thus supporting hypothesis 1 stating that the inclusion of new established firms 
could introduce a bias in the estimations. 
A higher R&D intensity (rdi_96) results in higher sales of new products. This is consistent with 
the economic model of section 2 and hypothesis 2 above. 
The effect of market structure measured by a Herfindahl-equivalent index (he3d98) on the sale 
of new products, departs from hypothesis 3. Instead of a U-shape, we find a non-linear negative 
relationship (a hockey stick on its back, with the tip of the stick facing upwards) between the 
seller concentration and sales of new products meaning that markets with a lower seller 
concentration i.e. dominated by relatively small firms generate more turnovers out of new 
products. Our empirical result is in congruence with most of empirical work on the relationship 
between competition and innovation (see Nickell, 1996), and this finding collaborates with the 
Schumpeter mark I theory (Schumpeter, 1934) and the Arrow's replacement effect, which 
restrain large companies to invest heavily in product innovations (Arrow, 1962). However this 
result does not comply completely with the proposed Schumpeterian and Product-life cycle 
models, put forward in the hypothesis section of this paper, which predict a U-shape relationship 
between innovative activities and market structure. Recently the relationship between 
competition and innovation became more puzzling. Agion et al. (2005) show that an inverted U-
shape relationship between competition and innovation fit UK panel data covering the period of 
1973-1994 much better, challenging both empirical and theoretical findings of the traditional 
Industrial Organization (IO) literature, and contraire to our theoretical and empirical findings. In 
their paper they present an alternative model which boils down to different strategic step-by-step 
product innovation behaviour in so called levelled and neck-and-neck industries. The 'escape-  18 
competition effect' increases the incremental profit from innovation, but the 'Schumpeterian 
effect' reduces innovation incentives for laggards as competition increase. "The balance between 
these two effects changes between low and high levels of competition, generating an inverted-U 
relationship", (Aghion et al, pp. 720-721). 
Parameter estimates of the fixed costs equation 
Product related R&D-investments 
Hypothesis 4 stated that there is a positive relationship between product-related R&D-
expenditures as a percentage of total R&D-investments and the fixed costs, which have to be 
recurred from sales of new products. The parameter estimate confirms this hypothesis showing a 
positive and significant coefficient. We also stated that according to economic theory sunk costs 
do not have any significance when to decide on investments like R&D-expenditures on the 
introduction of new products onto the market.  
R&D collaboration and R&D-subsidies 
In correspondence with hypothesis 5 R&D collaboration (partne96) and subsidies (subsid98) 
reduce the fixed costs of introduction although the effect of R&D-collaboration is insignificant. 
In the Netherlands a major R&D policy measure is a general tax-credit facility to lower the 
labour costs of R&D-personnel called the WBSO.
8 The purpose of the WBSO is to reduce the 
R&D costs of firms, in particular those of SME's. Large firms are bound to a maximum of tax-
credits. Subsidies including the WBSO are decreasing the costs of introducing new products onto 
the market. One could argue that the effect of the WBSO may not entirely exogenous. Firms 
anticipating the introduction of new products may have an incentive to apply.  
A possible explanation for not finding a significant effect of collaboration on the fixed costs 
could be that besides a costs reducing motive to be engaged in R&D-collaboration, there could 
be a skill sharing motive as well such as to develop and share new knowledge different fields of 
technology or different markets (Sakakibara, 1997). The estimates suggest that the cost-reducing 
motive is less important. That does not point automatically to the conclusion that the skill-
sharing motive is dominant. A skill-sharing motive may lead to the reduction of R&D-costs and 
thus the effect of a skill-sharing type of R&D-collaboration would not differ from a costs 
reducing type of R&D-collaboration regarding the fixed costs. Perhaps a better explanation could 
be to look at the type of knowledge the R&D-collaboration is focused on. The collaborative 
efforts could be focused on applied knowledge for specific products competing on the market 
(non-collusive R&D-cooperation) or geared towards more basic knowledge to strengthen the   19 
innovative skills of the collaborators on a basic level and in an early phase of the innovation 
cycle. In the latter case the effect of R&D-cooperation will have a (much) smaller or even 
insignificant effect on the fixed costs. We do not have additional information, which explanation 
is more plausible, but it seems that the skill-sharing type of R&D-collaboration is predominate.  
Knowledge spillovers 
Table 2 shows that all sources of information (brint_96, brrel_96 and brinf_96) lower the fixed 
costs significantly. The estimated coefficients show that knowledge spillovers (brinf_96) have 
the strongest and the use of internal knowledge the weakest effect. In concordance with Jaffe 
(1986) this result shows that innovating firms benefit from overall knowledge spillovers most. 
The question is how to interpret these findings. Jaffe (1986) argues that knowledge spillovers 
reflect the technological opportunities that exist in a particular branch. Technological 
opportunities are an incentive for product development and a signal that product differentiation 
is a profitable strategy. If a particular branch is low on technological opportunities the amount of 
research needed to come up with something new will be higher compared to a branch with an 
abundance of technological opportunities. According to Jaffe's reasoning it is not so much the 
knowledge itself as well as its signalling effect. That would explain why the coefficients of other 
sources of knowledge are in the same magnitude albeit on a lower level compared to knowledge 
spillovers (brinf_96). The estimates of brint_96, brrel_96 reveal something about the innovating 
strategies: firms rely on their own technological strength (technology initiators) or are more 
involved into developments in a distributed product development exposed by von Hippel 
(technology followers). Both strategies appear to be equally effective.  
Finally we have to mention the fit of out model is rather well. The Zimmerman Veal R2 and the 
Mc Fadden R2 are 0.50 and 0.19 respectively. The value of the logarithm of likelihood of the 
model and the baseline model are respectively –2892 and –3583.  
6  Summary and conclusions 
In this paper, we propose an economic model to analyse the sales out of new products. This 
model accounts for the fact that even among firms for which R&D is a permanent activity, a 
fraction of firms does not have sales of innovative products during a two-year observation 
period. In this study we analyse an indicator of a firm’s innovative output ‘new to the firm’. In 
this study we start from the assumption that, in order to introduce a product innovation, the firm 
                                                                                                                                            
8   WBSO is an acronym of the Dutch name of the act to encourage R&D (Wet Bevordering Speur- en   20 
must incur fixed costs. At the time of considering a new product introduction, the firm will 
compare fixed costs with expected (net) revenues during the economic lifetime of the product, 
and only if revenues exceed fixed costs (threshold), the firm will introduce the product.  
Our results show that firms face a threshold when deciding on whether or not to introduce new 
products onto the market. The fixed costs of introduction impose a hurdle to introduce new 
products. Firms are focused on means to lower those costs. Among the factors, which are of 
importance to lower the fixed costs are knowledge spillovers and R&D related subsidies. It 
comes at no surprise that R&D-related subsidies decrease the fixed costs. Of more interest are 
the differences between knowledge spillovers and sources of innovation and their effect on the 
fixed costs. Those differences reveal much about the knowledge management strategies of 
innovating firms. In general spillovers of public knowledge have a profound effect on the fixed 
costs, but interestingly knowledge spillovers originating from the firm itself or from suppliers 
and customers also have an equally decreasing effect on the fixed costs albeit at a lower level. 
This point at the process of the distributed innovation process described by von Hippel (1988) 
stating that the inventor and innovating actor do not necessarily coincide but who will be the 
innovator depends on which actor along the value chain is able to appropriate the economic rents 
of an innovation. The results show that both strategies of technology initiator and technology 
follower appear to be equally effective.  
We also find conformation of the idea that in the period preceding the introduction firms shift 
their R&D-expenditures towards market related activities such as expenditures on development 
of production facilities or specialised equipment, design and marketing and away from 
expenditures on fundamental or basic research according to the chain-linked model of Kline & 
Rosenberg (1986). The level of sales of new products depends on the R&D-intensity and market 
structure ones more substantiating the Schumpeter mark I paradigm and the Arrow replacement 
effect, meaning that small (high-tech) firms are more important to commercialize innovative 
products, partially substantiating the product-life cycle model of Cohen & Klepper (1996).  
The empirical results of Aghion et al (2005) and the proposed theoretical model to explain the 
inverted-U shape relationship between innovation and competition, although dealing with a 
slightly different topic we want to address in this paper, ones more show that the understanding 
of the relationship between incentives to innovate and competition leaves much to be desired.  
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Appendix, Data preparation and selection 
 
Economic theoretical considerations let to the decision to incorporate lagged exogenous 
variable in the model. To create a dataset with lagged variables we make use of two 
questionnaires. The first one is the regular Dutch CIS questionnaire comparable with the 
Eurostat version, which comprise data of the periode 1994-1996. Statistics Netherlands 
has the policy to repeat the CIS questionnaire after 2 years. This 'in between' 
questionnaire, covering the period of 1996-1998, is identical with the Eurostat version, 
although extended with some additional questions, which are of no concern for the 
purpose of this paper.  
 
The initial dataset has been constructed by merging the Dutch CIS2 (1994-1996) and 
CIS2½ (1996-1998) questionnaires. From this database of 10996 firms, three groups of 
firms were excluded: firms in the service sector, firms without any innovative activity 
according to the Frascati manual, and firms who are present in only one period. After the 
exclusion of those firms we are left with a database, which consists of 2278 firms of 
which we have information covering the whole period of 1994-1998. Those 2278 firms 
are the selection used to analyse the innovation threshold. Of those 2287 firms there are 
1001 firms with sales out of new products and 1277 without sales, i.e. firms assumed not 
be able to meet the threshold requirements.  
 
The main question is if the 2278 firms used in our analysis are representative for all 
firms. In order to analyse this potential selection bias we compared the mean values of 
four firms indicators among the various selections presented earlier. The indicators are: 
(1) the number of employees and (2) the turnover in 1998, representing different aspects 
of the size of the firms involved. The two other indicators are (3) the turnover per 
employee representing a kind of 'productivity' measure, and (4) the export quote 
representing a competition measure. Firms with a higher export quote are expected to 
face a stronger competition because they are operating on a global market, while firms 
with a lower export quote are geared towards the domestic market. Of course these 4 
indicators are rough indicators, constructed for the sole purpose of identifying a possible 
selection bias, and not for a serious analysis of firm characteristics. The descriptives of 
the four indicators and the results of a t-test whether the means are statistically different 
from each other are presented in the table below.  
 
Table 1 shows that the firms excluded from the main database are on average 
significantly smaller, both in terns of the number of employees and turnover. The 
turnover per employee does not differ significantly but the excluded firms on average 
have a significantly lower export quote. This selection bias can be explained by the 
sampling procedure Statistic Netherlands is using. Due to the very skewed distribution of 
firm size, approximately 82% of all firms in the Netherlands have 10 to 50 employees, a 
random selection of approximately 18% of the firms with 10 to 50 employees receive a 
CIS questionnaire, while all firms with 50 or more employees receive a questionnaire. 
Merging two datasets (CIS2 and CIS2½) small firms have a smaller propensity to be 
selected in both CIS questionnaires (3% » 0.18*0.18), and selecting only those firms, 
which are present in both questionnaires, causes a selection bias. To put it differently, 
merging two CIS questionnaires and selecting firms present in both questionnaires will   26 
favour the larger firms (i.e. 50 employees and more). This is reflected in the results of 
table 1, showing that the selected firms, which are present in both questionnaire are on 
average larger.    
 
Table 1  Descriptives of 4 firm indicators: number of employees, turnover, turnover per 
employee, and export quote in 1998 after merging CIS2 and CIS2½  















Whole database (CIS2 and CIS2½ merged)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
nr. obs.  10996mean  131.47 66138.55 521.216  11.3%
    std error mean  7.05 3473.37 31.973  0.002
firms not selected           
nr. obs.  8718mean  106.65 49263.96 518.463  8.6%
    std error mean  7.46 2656.46 39.378  0.002
firms selected           
nr. obs.  2278mean  226.44 130734.40 531.752  21.5%
    std error mean  18.44 13249.91 33.320  0.007
t-test: selected versus not selected firms         
    diff  -119.79 -81470.42 -13.289  -12.9%
    std err  19.89 13513.58 51.583  0.007
    t-value  -6.023 -6.029 -0.258  -17.938
    Prob >  | t|  0.0000 0.0000 0.7967  0.0000
 
 
Table 2  Descriptives of 4 firm indicators: number of employees, turnover, turnover per 
employee, and export quote in 1998 restricted to the population of firms 
meeting all selection criteria 















selected firms (nr. obs 2278)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
firms without turnover new products         
nr. obs.  1277mean  227.44 119672.90 623.736  10.6%
    std error mean  29.870 17679.830 56.261  0.007
firms with turnover new products         
nr. obs.  1001mean  225.17 144831.80 414.405  35.3%
    std error mean  17.580 20013.620 23.993  0.011
t-test: firm with versus without turnover new products       
    diff  2.27 -25158.90 209.332  -24.7%
    std err  34.66 26704.33 61.164  0.013
    t-value  0.066 -0.942 3.422  -18.810
    Prob >  | t|  0.9477 0.3462 0.0006  0.0000
 
As a second step we investigated whether there are differences between firms with and 
without sales out of new products. Table 2 shows the results. Within the population of 
selected firms size is not a discriminating factor anymore. However turnover per 
employee and the export quote differs significantly between the two subpopulations   27 
albeit in different directions. Firms with turnover out of new products on average have a 
lower turnover per employee but a higher export quote.   
 